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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates whether banks acquire information about the borrowing firms’ 
subsequent financial restatements during the misreporting period, a period in which firms issue 
misstated financial reports. Finance theory suggests that banks have superior ability in gathering 
and processing information. In this paper, I test whether banks respond to financial misreporting 
by their client firms before this malpractice becomes known to the public.  
I find that bank loans initiated to restating firms during the misreporting period have 
significantly higher interest spreads, more restrictive financial covenants, and shorter loan 
maturities than loans made to non-restating firms. This finding suggests that banks are aware of 
and responsive to borrowers’ ongoing financial misreporting. In contrast, equity holders do not 
respond differently to earnings announcements of restating firms than to those of non-restating 
firms. I also do not find an increase in analyst forecast dispersion for restating firms during the 
misreporting period. In addition, bondholders do not price new bond issues differently for 
restating and non-restating firms.  
Taken together, these empirical findings suggest that banks possess private information 
about ongoing financial misreporting by borrowers, which allows them to adapt their decisions 
more quickly than equity investors, financial analysts, and public debtholders.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Decision relevance of financial statements is a key objective in financial reporting, and 
reliability is a prerequisite for rendering information as relevant. As a result, any actions or 
events that undermine the reliability of financial statements threaten investors’ and creditors’ 
confidence in the information. Financial restatements are one of those events as they reduce the 
credibility of firms’ financial statements. Revealing the inaccuracy of previously reported 
financial numbers can lead to revised beliefs about the firm’s expected levels and risk of future 
cash flows. Prior literature has documented various adverse consequences of announcing 
restatements1; however, little is known about information use when the events that constitute 
misreporting were taking place (i.e., when firms issued misstated financial statements). Before 
firms announce the restatement, information about financial misreporting remains unknown to 
the public. In this study, I investigate whether banks access and use this private information 
during the misreporting period, identified as the time between the starting and ending dates of 
each restatement. Specifically, I use the pattern and behavior of the terms of bank loan contracts 
as the proxy for information acquisition to test whether banks’ decisions are consistent with 
possessing signals about the ongoing financial misreporting by borrowers. This test should be 
viewed as a joint test of banks’ acquisition and use of information in the lending process. 
Bank loans are a major source of corporate financing for most U.S. companies, and banks 
are considered to have superior access to client information (Fama 1985, Sharpe 1990, Diamond 
1991a). Loan contracts provide the mechanism for banks to closely monitor their clients and 
                                                        
1
 Prior studies document that restating firms are faced with negative stock market return (Palmrose et al. 2004, 
Anderson and Yohn 2002), increased cost of equity capital (Hribar and Jenkins 2004), higher information risk 
(Kravet and Shevlin 2010), and increased management turnover (Desai et al. 2006) after the announcement of 
restatement. 
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have continuous access to borrower information. Fama (1985) posits that banks, as inside debt 
holders, have access to information about borrowers that is not publicly available otherwise. If 
they do have a superior ability to gather and process information, banks should be able to 
identify signals diagnostic of financial misreporting earlier than other outside capital providers. 
Early identification of these signals allows banks to price the added risk and tailor contractual 
terms to safeguard their loans in a timely manner.2 The counterargument is that misreporting 
firms3 will try to prevent related information or signals of misconduct from being detected. 
Therefore, it is unclear a priori whether banks do in fact acquire information diagnostic of their 
client firms’ financial misreporting during the misreporting period. While much research has 
examined consequences of restatement announcements, there is no empirical evidence that 
addresses this important research question. 
Using a sample of restatement firms collected from Audit Analytics, this study identifies 
the misreporting period for each restatement and examines bank loans initiated during that 
period. To enhance the internal validity of this study, I adopt a matched-pair design and use non-
restating firms as a control group for comparison against matched restating firms. Each matched 
pair contains two firms of comparable size and in the same two-digit SIC (standard industrial 
classification) industry. For the final sample of 294 matched pairs, a difference-in-difference 
approach is implemented in the multivariate analysis to test the association between the 
incidence of financial misreporting and terms of loan contracts, after controlling for other micro 
and macro pricing factors. 
                                                        
2
 This reasoning remains as a proposition and a hypothesis because there is no sure way of using secondary data to 
categorically know that banks do in fact acquire such knowledge. 
3
 I use the terms “misreporting firms” and “restating firms” interchangeably throughout this paper as they both refer 
to firms that issue misreported financial statements and subsequently restate them at a later period. 
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The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that bank loans made to restating 
firms during the misreporting period have higher loan spreads than loans made to control firms. 
The increase in loan spreads ranges from 16 to 22 basis points and is both statistically and 
economically significant.4 In addition, during the misreporting period, loans made to restating 
firms have more restrictive financial covenants and shorter maturity than loans made to non-
restating borrowers. These findings are consistent with the proposition that banks acquire 
relevant information correlated with financial misreporting by their clients and tailor their loan 
terms accordingly.  
To verify that changes in loan terms are not made in response to publicly available 
information, I conduct three additional tests. First, I test equity holders’ reactions to earnings 
announcements during the test period. The results show no significant difference in the short-
window earnings announcement returns between restating and non-restating firms during the 
misreporting period. This finding suggests that equity holders do not respond differently to 
restating firms’ earnings announcements than to those of the control group, which implies that 
before public announcements investors are not aware of firms’ ongoing financial misreporting.  
Second, I examine whether financial analysts react to financial misreporting by firms 
they follow but do not find a significant change in analyst forecast dispersion for restating firms 
during the misreporting period. Third, additional analysis indicates that during the misreporting 
period bondholders also do not price new bonds differently for restating firms and non-restating 
firms. These findings consistently show that other agents who do not have access to private 
                                                        
4
 The results are based on controlling for other determinants of loan pricing and any existing difference in loan 
spreads between these two groups in the pre-misreporting period. In terms of magnitude, the estimated loan spread 
increase accounts for 10 percent or more of the average loan spreads of 176 basis points (or 1.76%) for the test 
sample. 
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information like banks do not make decisions consistent with having access to information about 
borrowing firms’ ongoing financial misreporting. 
This study makes three contributions. First, it enhances our understanding of the impact 
of events and actions preceding the public restatement announcements. In developing this 
understanding, I provide empirical evidence on banks’ acquisition of private information related 
to financial reporting misconduct during the misreporting period. As a result, this paper 
complements the findings of other studies that focus on the consequences of restatement 
announcement. In particular, I show that despite the opaque nature of financial misreporting, 
debt holders who have access to private information act as if they acquire relevant information 
about the ongoing irregularities. Second, by showing that banks are capable of acquiring relevant 
information in such a situation, this paper provides new evidence for the finance literature 
regarding banks’ ability to gather information from their borrowers. Finally, my findings can 
have practical implications as they demonstrate that informed stakeholders could bring about the 
economic consequences of financial misreporting for misreporting firms at an early stage of the 
restatement process.  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
related literature and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the research design, and 
Chapter 4 provides information about the sample and descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 present the main results and further analysis, respectively. Chapter 7 provides a 
summary discussion of the empirical results and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Financial misreporting 
Financial misreporting impairs the credibility of a firm’s financial statements. It leads 
users to revise their beliefs about the levels and risk of firm’s future cash flows because 
restatement is an admission of having made inaccurate financial reporting. As a result, 
restatement announcements often generate adverse consequences. Palmrose et al. (2004) 
document a 9 percent negative stock return over the two-day restatement announcement window. 
They also provide empirical evidence of higher analyst forecast dispersion and bid-ask spreads 
after the restatement announcement. Anderson and Yohn (2002) report similar findings on equity 
investors’ adverse reactions to the restatement as well as an increase in bid-ask spreads 
surrounding restatement announcements. These findings show a heightened level of uncertainty 
about the financial information of restating firms. Similarly, Hribar and Jenkins (2004) find an 
increase in the cost of equity capital for firms facing accounting restatements; Shi and Zhang 
(2008) document negative bond market reactions to the restatement news and an increase in risk 
premiums for new bonds issued subsequent to restatement announcements. More recently, 
Kravet and Shevlin (2010) find an increase in restating firms’ information risk, proxied by 
accrual quality, following the restatement announcements.5  
Although prior literature mostly addresses the reaction of public capital providers to 
restatement announcements, two recent studies investigate the effect of financial restatements on 
private debt holders (i.e., banks). Graham et al. (2008) study the effect of restatements on 
subsequent bank loan contracting and find that bank loans that are initiated after the restatement 
                                                        
5
 In addition to the negative impact of restatements on capital markets, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find a positive 
relationship between restatements and the incidents of litigation. Desai et al. (2006) also document that restating 
firms usually experience higher management turnover in the years after restatement announcements. 
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announcements have higher interest spreads, shorter maturities, a higher likelihood of being 
secured, and more covenant restrictions compared to loans initiated before the restatement 
announcement. Files and Gurun (2011) test the contagion effect of restatements on bank loans by 
examining whether restatements announced by peer firms, suppliers, or customers of a firm have 
an impact on the interest rates that bank lenders charge to that firm. While both studies examine 
the relationship between restatements and bank loans, they focus on the reaction of banks to 
public information of restatement announcements. In contrast, this study examines banks’ 
potential acquisition of private information about financial misreporting by concentrating on the 
misreporting period rather than on the period after restatement announcements.  
The misreporting period when a firm commits errors has received much less attention 
compared to restatement announcements, on which there is extensive evidence. One exception is 
Bardos et al. (2011), who examine whether investors see through misstated earnings and 
anticipate earnings restatements. They find that for firms that restate at least one annual report, 
investors were misled by mistakes in reported earnings at the time of initial earnings 
announcements. The authors show that investors reacted positively to the component of 
favorable earnings surprise that a firm subsequently restates and attached the same valuation to it 
as to the true earnings surprise.6 Their findings suggest that investors are misled by mistakes in 
reported earnings during the misreporting period, which further motivates this study to 
investigate banks’ ability in acquiring information about ongoing financial misreporting that is 
not readily observable or accessible to outside capital providers.7  
                                                        
6
 Their further analysis suggests that investors anticipate the subsequent downward restatements and start marking 
stock prices down three months before a restatement announcement. 
7
 In additional analysis, I also examine equity investors’ responses to earnings announcements during the 
misreporting period as a validation test. The results are consistent with Bardos et al. (2011). In another related study, 
Karpoff and Lou (2010) look at short sellers’ behavior prior to the announcement of financial reporting misconduct 
(i.e., AAERs). They find that short sellers accumulate positions in those firms before the public release of news. 
These findings suggest that short sellers anticipate the eventual discovery of financial misreporting. Because AAERs 
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Banks’ information gathering and processing 
Bank loans are different from other types of financing because banks monitor their clients 
closely throughout the loan-lending process and the continuous verification of borrowers’ 
adherence to debt covenants. Consequently, banks can obtain more information from their 
clients, giving them an information advantage over other capital providers. As the lending 
relationship evolves, banks learn more about client characteristics such that those borrowing 
firms are, in essence, “informationally captured” by their lending banks (Sharpe 1990).  
Fama (1985) posits that banks are inside debt holders who have access to information 
about a borrower that is not publicly available otherwise; such access to nonpublic information 
distinguishes bank lending from other “arm’s length” funding arrangements (Rajan 1992). The 
private information obtained by banks then generates lender-client specificity (Ariccia and 
Marquez 2004) that reduces information asymmetry between banks and borrowing firms. In 
summary, it is commonly accepted in the finance literature that banks are uniquely positioned to 
have more information about their borrowers than other capital market participants.  
Financial reporting and bank loan contracting 
In spite of the banks’ access to private information about borrowing firms, a significant 
component of the information on which they rely is made public in the form of financial 
statements. Financial statements play a significant role because a large number of debt covenants 
are based on accounting numbers or financial ratios.  
Prior literature provides evidence that shows how important financial reporting quality is 
in loan contracting. Ball et al. (2008) investigate the effect of debt-contracting value on 
syndicated loans. In their study, debt-contracting value is proxied by the use of publicly reported 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
usually represent the most egregious cases of financial misreporting, it is unclear whether these findings would hold 
in a general sample of restatements, as used in this study. However, the findings of both studies have implications 
for this paper, and further investigation may be necessary.  
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accounting data for the timely prediction of the deterioration in a borrower’s credit quality. They 
document that the lead arranger holds a smaller portion of new loan deals when the borrowing 
firm’s accounting information has a higher debt-contracting value. According to the authors, this 
finding implies less information asymmetry between the lead arranger and other syndicate 
participants. Subsequently, Minnis (2011) examines the value of financial statement verification 
in debt financing for private U.S. firms and finds that audited private firms have a significantly 
lower cost of debt and that lenders more heavily weight audited financial information when 
setting the interest rate of loan contracts. In another study, Demerjian (2011) investigates the 
effect of change in accounting standards on the use of accounting-based covenants in bank loan 
contracts and finds that a policy shift towards a balance-sheet approach is associated with 
reductions in balance-sheet covenants used in private debt contracts.  
The above discussion suggests that banks have strong incentives to monitor the financial 
reporting quality of borrowers because it is highly relevant in assessing borrowers’ performance 
and credit risk. 
I am interested in whether the unencumbered access to information, coupled with ample 
time and the ability to process information, allows banks to locate signals of financial 
misreporting by borrowing firms at an early stage. Because information acquisition and 
processing by bank lenders is not directly observable, the lending decision outcome is used as 
evidence from which inferences can be made about the use of information regarding the financial 
misreporting of borrowers. 
If the discovery of a reporting error increases the perception of client risk, this updated 
risk assessment will be reflected in the terms of bank loans initiated or renegotiated after this 
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finding.8 For instance, banks may charge higher interest rates or impose more restrictive 
covenants on the loans to compensate for the increased risk of the borrowing firms. As a result, I 
anticipate that if banks acquire relevant information with respect to their clients’ financial 
misreporting, they will use the information to set the terms of new loans. In a sense, therefore, 
testing hypothesis using decision outcome is a joint test of banks’ acquisition and use of 
information. 
My first test hypothesis examines the difference between interest rate spreads on the 
loans made to the treatment (restating) and control (non-restating) groups. These loans originated 
during the misreporting period, and the test controls for two main factors: (a) the loan-spread 
differences during the pre-misreporting period and (b) other determinants of interest rate spreads, 
including borrower-specific variables, loan-specific variables, and macroeconomic factors. The 
hypothesis stated in an alternative form is as follows: 
  
H1: During the misreporting period, interest rate spreads on bank loans are higher for restating 
firms than for non-restating firms, after controlling for other determinants and pre-misreporting 
differences. 
 
In addition to interest rates, the direct cost of borrowing, loan contracts include non-price 
terms. Lenders could use both price and non-price terms to mitigate the information problems 
they face when designing loan contracts (Graham et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2011). Non-price terms 
are also used to manage potential conflicts between lenders and borrowers (Vasvari 2008). 
Chava and Roberts (2008) describe the presence of loan covenants as motivated and rationalized 
by their ability to mitigate agency problems and to assist in obtaining financing through the 
                                                        
8
 Because the data on loan renegotiation is not available, this paper focuses on newly initiated bank loans. 
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pledge of state-contingent control rights. Prior literature on debt covenants indicates that lenders 
could improve ex post monitoring of borrowers by their judicial use of loan covenants that allow 
lenders to monitor the borrower’s credit quality subsequent to loan initiation (Rajan and Winston 
1995). It is therefore reasonable to expect loans issued to borrowers with information problems 
to contain more restrictive covenants. This is my second test hypothesis stated in an alternative 
form: 
 
H2: During the misreporting period, more restrictive financial covenants are used in bank loans 
for restating firms as compared to non-restating firms, after controlling for other determinants 
and pre-misreporting differences. 
 
The third main indicator of loan terms is debt maturity, which is a function of the 
borrower’s risk level (Diamond 1991b). Lenders can adjust the loan maturity according to 
borrower risk and performance. By issuing short-term loans to borrowers with information 
problems, lenders can periodically evaluate borrower performance and maintain a stronger 
bargaining position through the near-term debt renewal process. Therefore, high-risk firms, 
which have a high probability of default, may be denied long-term loans (Graham et al. 2008). 
As financial misreporting heightens the perceived risk of a firm, I predict that bank loans made 
to restating firms have shorter maturity than loan contracts for non-restating firms during the 
misreporting period. This leads to my third hypothesis: 
 
H3: During the misreporting period, bank loans initiated to restating firms have shorter maturity 
as compared to bank loans initiated to non-restating firms, after controlling for other 
determinants and pre-misreporting differences. 
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It should be noted, however, that banks’ acquisition of information regarding borrower 
financial misreporting is by no means guaranteed despite their superior information access and 
processing capability. In fact, it is unclear, ex ante, whether banks are able to obtain any private 
information related to the ongoing misreporting of borrowing firms. If firms intentionally 
misreport their financial information in order to cover poor performance or to avoid debt-
covenant violations, they will try to hide the information from all parties, including lenders. 
Therefore, banks’ acquisition of relevant information with respect to the ongoing misreporting 
by borrowing firms is an empirical question that needs to be examined.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design is structured around the timeline of financial misreporting. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the period between the starting and ending dates of misreporting is 
defined as the “Misreporting Period” (T1) during which firms issue misstated financial 
statements. This is also the test period for examining the terms of bank loans issued to restating 
firms. On the other hand, the “Pre-Misreporting Period” (T0) represents the period before the 
inception of misreporting. Loan contracts initiated during this period are used as controls in the 
empirical tests. To further highlight the different focus of time period in this study from others, 
the “Post-Restatement Period” (T2) is also marked on the timeline referring to the period after the 
public announcement of restatement.9,10  
Table 1 outlines how this study attempts to examine the terms of bank loans during the 
test period. To enhance the internal validity of the test, I use a matched-pair sample design to 
compare selected terms of bank loans made between restating firms (X1) and non-restating firms 
(C1) during the misreporting period (T1) and examine the difference (i.e., X1,i – C1,i , where i = 
loan interest rate spread, number of financial covenants, and loan maturity). Each restating firm 
is matched with a control firm, based on industry and firm size11, which did not have restatement 
at any time. To isolate the effect of financial misreporting from other factors, a comparison is 
made between the terms of bank loans made to restating firms (X0) and those made to non-
                                                        
9
 Nevertheless, in unreported analysis I compare interest rate spreads between loans made to restating and non-
restating firms in the post-restatement period to examine whether there is any incremental effect of restatement 
announcement on direct borrowing cost upon its public revelation. I do not find a significant increase in interest rate 
spread during this period, as compared to the misreporting period.  
10
 The period between the ending date of misreporting and the restatement announcement date is the error discovery 
period. Because information leakage could occur during this period and the length of this period varies significantly 
across cases of restatement, this error discovery period is not included in the analysis. 
11
 In further analysis, I add accrual quality as the third matching variable to address the possibility that banks, 
instead of having access to private information, simply adjust loan terms to reflect their prediction of (or concern 
about) potential earnings management. See Section IV for details. 
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restating firms (C0) during the pre-misreporting period (T0), and the difference (i.e., X0,i – C0,i) is 
used as a benchmark. This “difference-in-difference” approach essentially tests X1-C1 
conditioning on X0-C0; therefore, it provides a cleaner examination of the association between 
financial misreporting and the terms of bank loans than an unconditional comparison.  
Given the above design, this study uses a regression analysis to empirically test the three 
hypotheses by examining the relationship between financial misreporting and the three variables 
of loan contracting (e.g., interest rate spread, number of financial covenants, and loan maturity). 
The following regression model implements the difference-in-difference approach to examine 
the effect of financial misreporting on loan interest rate spread:12 
 =
	 +		
	 +		 +	_
 +	_	 !	 +
"#$_	 !	 + 	%$&'_(	 !	 + 	)	                          (1) 
 
AIS refers interest rate spread, the direct borrowing cost of a bank loan. It is measured by 
the all-in spread drawn (plus the annual fee, if any) in basis points over the London Inter-Bank 
Offer Rate (LIBOR),13 divided by 100.14 RES is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
borrower is the firm that had restated previous financial statements; otherwise, it equals 0. 
POSTMIS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank loan was originated during the 
misreporting period and 0 if the bank loan was originated before the inception of misreporting. 
The test variable of interest is the interaction term, POSTMIS_RES, which is the product of RES 
and POSTMIS. The coefficient 	on POSTMIS_RES captures the difference in loan interest 
spread that restating firms need to pay during the misreporting period compared to non-restating 
firms. Therefore, H1 implies  > 0, which suggests that banks charge higher interest rates on 
                                                        
12
 Firm and time denotations are suppressed in the equation for ease of presentation. 
13
 All-in spread represents a composite way to report the pricing of bank loans such that a comparison can be made 
across multiple loans regardless of the underlying fee and spread structure. 
14
 1 basis point = 0.01%. Therefore, dividing basis points by 100 creates a measure of interest spread in percentage 
(e.g., 1.50 indicates 1.50%). 
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loans issued to restating firms compared with control firms during the misreporting period. This 
test is conditional on the difference in borrowing cost between these two groups of firms over the 
pre-misreporting period.  
The analysis controls for three sets of factors that impact loan interest cost: (a) borrower-
specific determinants, (b) loan-specific determinants, and (c) macroeconomic factors, following 
prior literature (e.g., Graham et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2011, Bharath et al. 2011).  
(a) Borrower-specific determinants: 
The firm-specific variables that determine a borrower’s credit risk are used as control 
variables. LEVERAGE is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets and is an indicator of 
financial and credit risk. Therefore, higher leverage is predicted to be associated with higher 
interest rate spreads. PROFITABILITY is measured as return on assets; more profitable firms are 
likely to have lower borrowing cost. The third variable is sales growth, GROWTH, which is 
expected to positively correlate with loan spreads as growing firms are often faced with high 
risk. Controlling for these three firm-level variables is particularly relevant in light of previous 
literature that examines the predictability of accounting manipulation using public financial 
variables (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996, Richardson et al. 2002, Dechow et al. 2011). Because this 
study investigates the possibility that banks have superior access to private information about 
financial misreporting, I attempt to control for the effect of other publicly available predicting 
variables on the contractual terms of bank loans.  
Several other firm-level determinants of loan interest rates are also included. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets; larger firms are expected to have smaller interest rate spreads. 
MTB is the market-to-book ratio measured as market value of equity divided by the book value 
of equity. This variable is predicted to be negatively associated with borrowing cost to the extent 
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that it represents the additional value over book assets that debt holders can access in the event of 
default. TANGIBILITY is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Firms with a 
higher proportion of tangible assets are expected to have lower borrowing costs because lenders 
can recover those tangible assets in the event of loan default. CFVOLATILITY, the cash flow 
volatility, is measured as the standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from operations over the 
eight fiscal quarters prior to loan initiation, deflated by total assets. Similar to Graham et al. 
(2008), I use CFVOLATILITY as a proxy for earnings risk and expect this variable to be 
positively associated with the cost of debt. The Altman’s Z-score, ALTMANZ, is also included to 
capture the estimated default risk and should negatively correlate with the interest rate spreads as 
a higher score indicates a lower default risk. Finally, the variable RETURN, the buy-and-hold 
return over 90 days before the initiation of a loan facility, is included to capture banks’ potential 
use of information from the stock market in their lending decisions.  
(b) Loan-specific determinants: 
The extant literature shows that loan-specific characteristics are related to the interest cost 
of borrowing (Strahan 1999, Bharath et al. 2008, Graham et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2011). To 
control for these factors, I include the following variables in Equation (1): LMATURITY, 
LLOANSIZE, LNLENDER, PPRICING, and SYNDICATION. LMATURITY is the natural 
logarithm of loan maturity in months. Previous research finds that lenders charge lower interest 
rates for loans with shorter maturity (Graham et al. 2008, Bharath et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2011). 
Therefore, a positive relationship is predicted between LMATURITY and interest rate spreads. 
LLOANSIZE is the natural logarithm of each loan facility in dollars, and a negative coefficient is 
expected for LLOANSIZE as larger loan facilities are usually charged with lower interest rates. 
LNLENDER is the natural logarithm of the number of lenders (i.e., banks) in the loan deal. 
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PPRICING is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan contract contains performance pricing 
provisions and equal to 0 otherwise. Loan contracts that involve higher numbers of lenders and 
performance pricing provisions are expected to have lower interest rates. SYNDICATION is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan facility is syndicated and equals 0 otherwise. This 
variable captures any difference in the interest rate charged for syndicated versus non-syndicated 
loans. 
(c) Macroeconomic factors: 
I include two variables to control for the potential effects of macroeconomic conditions 
on loan contracting (Graham et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2011, Files and Gurun 2011). CSPREAD, 
capturing the credit spread, is the difference between the yields of BAA- and AAA-rated 
corporate bonds, and TSPREAD, the proxy for term spread, is measured as the difference in yield 
between ten-year and two-year U.S. Treasury bonds. Prior research suggests that credit spread 
and term spread are good indicators of macroeconomic conditions and that they help to explain 
stock and bond returns (Chen et al. 1986, Fama and French 1993, Graham et al. 2008). Because 
investors require more compensation for increased default risk in bad economic conditions, 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) argue that credit spreads tend to increase in recessions and decrease 
in expansions. Therefore, CSPREAD is expected to be positively associated with loan spreads if 
individual loan contracts reflect the economy-wide default risk.   
To examine the second hypothesis, the following empirical model, similar to Equation 
(1), is adopted: 
,-. =
		 +		
	 +		 +	_
 + _	 !	 +
	"#$_	 !	 + 	%$&'_(	 !	 + 	)	                         (2) 
  17
FINCOV is the number of financial covenants in a loan contract,15 and the other variables 
are the same as in Equation (1). Following Kim et al. (2011), I use the Poisson regression to test 
the effect of financial misreporting on the use of financial covenants in bank loans because the 
dependent variable here is the total number of financial covenants included in the loan 
agreement. The main test variable in Equation (2) is POSTMIS_RES, the interaction term of the 
restatement and misreporting period indicators. H2 predicts a positive coefficient  on 
POSTMIS_RES, which suggests that banks impose more restrictive financial covenants on loans 
issued to restating firms during the misreporting period than on loans issued to non-restating 
firms. Similar to Equation (1), this model also controls for any difference in covenants imposed 
on loans issued to these two groups of firms in the pre-misreporting period.  
In addition to the main test variables, this regression includes several borrower-specific, 
loan-specific, and macroeconomic factors that are potential determinants of covenant decisions. 
Following Bradley and Roberts (2004), I expect the use of restrictive financial covenants to be 
positively associated with leverage and negatively correlated with firm size and tangibility. With 
respect to loan characteristics, loans with longer maturity are expected to have more covenants. 
Finally, the credit spread, a proxy for the general economic risk, is predicted to correlate 
positively with the inclusion of covenants. 
Next, an empirical test on the association between loan maturity and financial 
misreporting uses the following model: 
#/
0 =
		 +		
	 +		 +	_
 + _	 !	 +
	"#$_	 !	 + 	%$&'_(	 !	 + 	)             (3) 
 
                                                        
15
 Because the financial covenants are set for each package (i.e., deal) of bank loans, I select the facility with the 
largest loan amount in each loan package for the analysis to avoid the spurious relationship that may arise from the 
inclusion of multiple facilities of the same loan package. 
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LMATURITY is the natural logarithm of loan maturity in the bank loan contract, and the 
other variables are the same as in Equation (1).16 H3 predicts a negative coefficient 	on 
POSTMIS_RES, suggesting that bank loans made to restating firms during the misreporting 
period have shorter maturities than loans given to non-restating firms after controlling for any 
difference in the pre-misreporting period.  
 
  
                                                        
16 Except that LMATURITY, by construct, is no longer included as a loan-specific control variable on the right-hand 
side of the regression. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Restatement Data 
The initial restatement sample is selected from the Audit Analytics database that contains 
information about restatements filed by all SEC registrants beginning January 1, 2000. This 
database includes 10,815 restatements filed by approximately 6,900 firms from 2000 to 2010. 
Audit Analytics uses software to search all Edgar filings, which allows more efficient 
identification of restatements filed without announcement in Form 8-K or in a press release, 
particularly restatements noted only in Form 10-K or Form 10-Q (Scholz 2008). The inclusion of 
these so-called “stealth” restatements is suitable for the setting in this study because the main 
purpose here is to examine whether banks gather any information with respect to the borrowing 
firms’ ongoing misreporting, regardless of the form of eventual restatement disclosures.17 For 
each restatement, Audit Analytics identifies the filing date of the restatement as well as the 
starting and ending dates of the restated period. Because this study focuses on the misreporting 
period, I keep only the first restatement for firms that restate their financial statements more than 
once in order to avoid any confounding effects.18 This filtering process and a further exclusion of 
financial institutions leave 5,872 unique restatements in the sample. The sample selection 
procedure is presented in Table 2, Panel A. 
Loan Data 
Data on bank loans come from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan database, 
which contains detailed loan information about commercial loans made to U.S. and foreign 
                                                        
17
 Scholz (2008) compares different restatement databases for the overlapping periods and finds that Audit Analytics 
includes nearly all restatements captured in the GAO reports and Lexis-Nexis searches and some that are not 
identified through these methods. 
18
 Such a confounding effect may arise from the fact that the misreporting period of the first restatement could 
overlap with the pre-misreporting period of the second restatement. 
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corporations. In DealScan, loan data are complied for each deal (also referred as package), which 
is a loan contract made between a borrower and lender(s) at a specific date. Each package will 
have only one facility (the basic unit of a loan) or several facilities with varying price and non-
price terms. Following prior literature (Graham et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2011, Files and Gurun 
2011), I consider each facility as a separate unit of loan observation because loan spreads and 
loan characteristics vary across facilities.  
Loan data are merged with accounting data from Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly for 
the most recent quarter prior to the initiation of a loan facility and with return data from CRSP 
Daily Stock. This dataset is then combined with unique restatements described in the previous 
section, which creates a sample of 1,521 restating firms with data. To facilitate the inter-period 
comparison, I further require that each firm have data available in both misreporting and pre-
misreporting periods. This reduces the sample to 379 restating firms with a total number of 2,569 
loan facilities.  
Selecting Matched-pair Control Sample 
For the construction of a control sample, each of the remaining treatment (restating) firms 
is matched with a control (non-restating) firm using the same two-digit SIC industry and the 
smallest difference in firm size.19 These criteria identify 294 matched non-restating firms with 
available data on bank loans and other variables for the test period. In total, the final sample 
contains 588 firms with a total number of 3,142 loan facilities spanning the period from 1989 to 
2009, of which 1,694 loan facilities come from restating firms and 1,448 loan facilities from 
those matched non-restating firms. 
                                                        
19
 Total assets at the fiscal quarter ending prior to the beginning date of misreporting period are used here for the 
matching, and I require that total assets of a control firm fall within the range of 50%-150% of the restating firm’s. 
  21
Table 2, Panel B reports the distribution of restating firms in the final sample by year. 
The number of unique restatements20 increases from 2000 to 2005 and starts to decrease in 2006, 
a pattern consistent with what is observed in the full sample reported by Audit Analytics 
(Cheffers et al. 2009).  
Table 2, Panel C lists the restating firms sorted by Fama-French 17 industries. Panel D of 
Table 2 reports the distribution of loan facilities by misreporting period. For the 294 restating 
firms, 1,042 loans were initiated before the misreporting period and 652 loans during the 
misreporting period. For non-restating firms, 906 loans were initiated before the misreporting 
period and 542 loans during the misreporting period.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel A presents the 
descriptive statistics of the loan-specific variables, while Panel B those of the test variables and 
the borrower-specific variables considered in this study. The mean and median drawn all-in 
spreads over LIBOR (i.e., AIS) are approximately 1.76% and 1.50%, respectively, with a 
standard deviation of approximately 1.36%. The mean (median) loan maturity is approximately 
46 (48) months, while the mean (median) loan facility size is $287 ($145) million. On average, 
51.9 percent of the loan facilities have a performance pricing provision. Most of the loan 
facilities are syndicated loans with, on average, nine lenders.  
As shown in Panel B of Table 3, restating firms comprise approximately 53.9 percent of 
the loan facilities. Approximately 38 percent of loans were initiated during the misreporting 
period, while 62 percent were issued before the misreporting. For firm-specific variables, SIZE 
has a mean (median) of 6.80 (6.76) and market-to-book ratio (MTB) has a mean (median) of 3.28 
                                                        
20
 Because of the research design, each restating firm has a unique restatement. Thus, the by-year distribution of 
restating firms corresponds to that of unique restatements. 
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(2.17). In addition, total debt, EBITDA, and tangible assets on average account for 31 percent, 
3.4 percent, and 33 percent of total assets, respectively.  
Univariate Comparisons 
The full sample is partitioned into the misreporting period and pre-misreporting period. 
For each subsample, loan features and borrower characteristics are compared between (1) 
borrowers engaged in financial misreporting (i.e., restating firms) and (2) borrowers not engaged 
in financial misreporting (i.e., control firms). Table 4, Panel A presents the mean and median of 
loan features and borrower-specific characteristics of these two subsamples for the misreporting 
period, while Panel B of Table 4 reports the statistics for the same characteristics of the two 
subsamples for the pre-misreporting period. As shown in Table 4, Panel A, the mean (median) 
AIS is approximately 2.07% (1.75%) for restating firms and 1.77% (1.50%) for non-restating 
firms. The mean and median differences are both significant at 1%, suggesting that lenders 
charge higher interest rate spreads to restating firms as compared to non-restating firms during 
the misreporting period.  
In terms of loan maturity, the mean (median) maturity is approximately 49 (48) months 
for loans to restating firms in the misreporting period, and the mean (median) maturity for loans 
to non-restating firms is approximately 45 (48) months. Other loan features have no significant 
differences between loans awarded to test and control firms during the misreporting period. 
However, restating firms on average have larger size, higher leverage, higher default risk, lower 
cash flow volatility, and a higher proportion of tangible assets.  
As shown in Table 4, Panel B, the mean (median) AIS for loans to restating firms is 
approximately 1.72% (1.50%) in the pre-misreporting period. For loans made to non-restating 
firms before the misreporting period, the mean and median AIS are 1.58% and 1.25%, 
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respectively. While the mean difference in AIS between restating and non-restating firms is also 
significant at 5%, the magnitude of the difference during the pre-misreporting period (0.14%) is 
less than one half of that during the misreporting period (0.30%).  
As to the comparison of loan maturity, the mean (median) loan maturity of loans to 
restating firms is 48 (50) months, which is significantly higher than the maturity of loans to non-
restating firms (mean [median] is 42 [36]) during the pre-misreporting period.  
Regarding other borrower-specific characteristics, restating firms have higher leverage, 
higher growth, and higher likelihood of default than non-restating firms.  This finding is 
consistent with prior literature that suggests that firms may have incentives to misreport their 
financial results, which include maintaining high growth and avoiding default or covenant 
violations. 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 5 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between selected loan and borrower 
variables. The loan spread, AIS, is positively correlated with POSTMIS_RES, the main variable 
of interest, at 1% (correlation coefficient = 0.116), suggesting that banks charge higher interest 
rates to restating firms during the misreporting period than to non-restating borrowers. 
Correlations between borrower-specific variables and AIS generally behave in the predicted 
direction.  For example, AIS is negatively correlated with SIZE, PROFITABILITY, and 
ALTMANZ, but it is positively correlated with LEVERAGE, GROWTH, CFVOLATILITY, and 
RETURN. With regard to other loan features, AIS is positively correlated with loan maturity 
(LMATURITY) but negatively correlated with loan size (LLOANSIZE), provision of performance 
pricing (PPRICING), and number of lenders (LNLENDER).  
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CHAPTER 5 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Misreporting and Loan Spread: Test of H1 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating the regression model, Equation (1), using AIS as 
the dependent variable. In Column 1 of Table 6, AIS is regressed on the main test variable, 
POSTMIS_RES, and the two lower-level variables, RES and POSTMIS (including year and 
industry fixed effects).21 The control variables are added incrementally to this basic regression 
model, and the estimated results are reported in Column 2 through Column 5. All of these 
models include controlling for various combinations of fixed effects. Column 2 adds borrower-
specific control variables; Column 3 controls for loan-specific variables and fixed effects of loan 
purpose and loan type. Column 4 includes macroeconomic variables, CSPREAD and TSPREAD, 
and Column 5 has the full model with adjustment of the standard errors for firm- and year-level 
clustering.  
All results in Table 6 show a statistically significant positive coefficient on 
POSTMIS_RES, consistent with the prediction of H1. The level of significance varies by the 
scope of explanatory variables. The coefficient is significantly positive at 10% in Column 1 
(t=1.94), and similar results hold as I incrementally add various sets of control variables to the 
regression model. As reported in Columns 2 and 3, the coefficients on POSTMIS_RES continue 
to be significantly positive after borrower-specific and loan-specific variables are controlled for 
(t-statistic equals 2.63 [2.19] in Column 2 [3], significant at 1% [5%]). Finally, the addition of 
macroeconomic factors as controls, shown in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6, does not change the 
main effect of misreporting on bank loan spread (t = 2.16 [1.83] in Column 4 [5]). The adjusted 
                                                        
21
 I use the Fama-French 17 industry definition to construct industry dummy variables. The results remain the same 
if the two-digit SIC code is used instead. 
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R-square is approximately 52 percent in Column 5, a level that is comparable to those of prior 
studies on loan contracting (e.g., Graham et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2011, Files and Gurun 2011).22  
The estimated coefficients on the control variables, as shown in Table 6, are generally 
consistent with predictions, which provide further validity of the results. Loan spread is 
negatively associated with profitability, borrower size, loan facility size, and the presence of 
performance pricing provisions. Additionally, loan spread is positively associated with leverage, 
growth, default risk, and cash flow volatility. While not the subject of a test hypothesis, loan 
spread is also positively associated with stock return; this suggests that banks may use the stock 
performance of borrowers as a proxy for potential investment opportunities and thus charge 
higher interest rate spreads when expecting higher growth. As for macroeconomic variables, loan 
spread is negatively associated with credit spread while the coefficient is not significant.23  
The above finding shows that banks charge higher interest rates for loans issued to 
restating firms during the misreporting period than for those issued to non-restating firms. This 
result obtains after controlling for any existing difference between the borrowing costs of these 
two groups of firms in the pre-misreporting period and other determinants of loan interest rate 
spread. Restating firms, on average, pay 0.16% to 0.22% more for the interest on bank loans 
during the misreporting period than non-restating borrowers. This suggests that the increase in 
bank loan spread due to financial misreporting is both statistically and economically 
significant.24 
Misreporting and Financial Covenants: Test of H2 
                                                        
22
 The adjusted R-square also increases from 7 percent in Column 1 to 52 percent in Column 5, suggesting 
improvement in the model specification. 
23
 In an untabulated analysis, I find a significantly positive coefficient on credit spread when the year dummies are 
not included in the regression model, suggesting that the effect of credit spread could be subsumed by the inclusion 
of time indicators. This is reasonable given that time indicators, to some extent, also capture the macroeconomic 
conditions. 
24
 The average interest spread for the full sample is 1.76% (see Table 3), thus an increase of 0.16%–0.22% 
represents about, or more than, 10 percent of the borrowing cost. 
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To assess the impact of financial misreporting on lenders’ use of restrictive financial 
covenants, Equation (2) is estimated with FINCOV (the number of financial covenants included 
in each loan package) as the dependent variable in the context of Poisson regression, following 
prior literature (Graham et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2011). Because financial covenants are set at the 
package (or deal) level, I select the loan facility with the largest amount of borrowings from each 
loan package.25 As a result, the number of observations is smaller than that in the previous test of 
loan interest spread. Table 7 reports the results from five specifications of the regression model 
(Columns 1–5), similar to Table 6. The goodness-of-fit chi-squared statistic in every 
specification has a p-value near 1.00; this finding indicates that Poisson regression is suitable 
because the null hypothesis that the dependent variable is Poisson distributed cannot be rejected.  
In Table 7, Column 1, the number of financial covenants is regressed on RES, POSTMIS, 
and the interaction term, POSTMIS_RES, without controlling for other determinants of loan 
covenants. The estimated coefficient on POSTMIS_RES is positive and significant at 10%. The 
coefficient remains positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05 in Columns 2–5) as I 
incrementally add different sets of control variables to the regression model. This indicates that 
the effect of misreporting on the increase in the number of restrictive financial covenants in bank 
loans holds after controlling for other known determinants of the use of financial covenants. This 
result is also robust to any omitted industry- or time-specific characteristics that could influence 
the use of financial covenants in loan contracts.  
With respect to control variables, the results suggest that lenders tend to impose fewer 
financial covenants on larger borrowers, larger loans, loans with more lenders, and borrowers 
with a higher percentage of tangible assets. On the other hand, the borrower’s leverage is 
positively associated with the intensity of financial covenants in the loan contract. These results 
                                                        
25
 See footnote 4.  
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are generally consistent with those of prior studies (Bradley and Roberts 2004, Graham et al. 
2008, Kim et al. 2011).26  
The H2 test results suggest that lenders write more restrictive financial covenants on 
loans to restating borrowers than on loans to non-restating clients during the misreporting period. 
Misreporting and Loan Maturity: Test of H3 
To assess the impact of financial misreporting on loan maturity, I estimate Equation (3), 
with LMATURITY (the natural logarithm of maturity) as the dependent variable, and 
incrementally add various control variables to the regression specification. As reported in in 
Column 3 of Table 8, the coefficient on POSTMIS_RES becomes significantly negative at 5% (t 
= -2.46) after controlling for the loan-specific variables and fixed effects of loan purpose and 
loan type. The same results hold after I include macroeconomic variables in Columns 4 and 5.27  
This finding, consistent with the prediction of H3, indicates that loans initiated to 
restating firms during the misreporting period are associated with a shorter maturity than loans 
made to non-restating borrowers. Similar to Graham et al. (2008), loan maturity is positively 
associated with other control variables such as borrower’s profitability, size of the loan facility, 
and provision of performance pricing. In addition, loans with more lenders tend to have longer 
maturity.  
In summary, the results obtained from all tests confirm the three hypotheses. Consistent 
with H1, the findings show that banks charge higher interest rate spreads for loans issued to 
restating firms during the misreporting period than loans made to non-restating firms during the 
same period. As H2 predicts, banks also impose more restrictive financial covenants on loans 
                                                        
26
 The adjusted R-square of the full regression model (Table 6, Column 5) is equal to 0.04, similar to that reported 
by Graham et al. (2008). 
27
 With the adjusted R-square of approximately 70 percent in Column 5, as compared to only 9 percent in Column 3, 
the full model has significantly improved the model specification. 
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made to restating firms as compared to loans made to control firms during the misreporting 
period. Finally, the maturity of loans issued to restating firms during the misreporting period is 
shorter than that of loans issued to non-restating firms after controlling for other explanatory 
variables; these results directly support the prediction of H3. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that banks acquire information about ongoing financial misreporting by borrowers, and 
such information influences their lending decisions in the price and nonprice contractual terms 
during the misreporting period. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Earnings Announcement Returns and Financial Misreporting 
The cross-sectional test results confirm the hypothesis that banks are aware of ongoing 
misreporting by borrowers and tailor price as well as non-price terms of newly issued loans to 
reflect the added risks and information problems. Banks appear to process borrower financial 
misreporting before the restatement announcement.  
If the information to which banks have access pertains to private information, it would be 
relevant to show that external users without access to the same information do not reflect that 
information in their decisions. To conduct this validation test, I first examine the impact of 
earnings announcements by misreporting firms on equity prices. Specifically, this analysis 
compares market returns around earnings announcements between restating firms and non-
restating firms during the misreporting period. A negative effect of financial misreporting on 
short-window returns around the earnings announcement period would indicate that investors are 
able to detect ongoing financial reporting misconduct. On the contrary, if external investors 
remain unaware of ongoing financial misreporting, there would be no significant difference in 
earnings announcement returns between two groups of firms. 
I run a regression model similar to that of Burks (2011) for the empirical analysis: 
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CRET is the size-adjusted, buy-and-hold stock return of a firm i measured over the three-
day window (-1, +1) around the quarterly earnings announcement. RES is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the earnings announcement is made by a firm that has subsequently restated 
financial statements and 0 otherwise. POSTMIS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
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earnings announcement is made during the misreporting period and 0 if made in the pre-
misreporting period. Definitions of misreporting and pre-misreporting period are the same as 
previously described. The main test variable is POSTMIS_RES, the interaction term of RES and 
POSTMIS. Observing a negative coefficient  on POSTMIS_RES implies that investors have 
detected the problem during the misreporting period. Contrarily, if investors are not aware of 
ongoing misreporting, 	will not be different from zero.  
In this model, I also include several control variables following prior literature. SIZE is 
the firm size measured as natural logarithm of total assets. MBE, which captures whether the 
reported earnings meet or beat the analyst forecast, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the actual 
earnings are equal to or higher than the most recent mean analyst forecast and equal to 0 
otherwise. ESURPRISE, a proxy for earnings surprise, is measured as the difference between the 
actual earnings and the most recent mean analyst forecast, scaled by stock price. Finally, 
VOLATILITY_INDEX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s volatility index on the day 
before the earnings announcement.  
To implement this analysis, additional data need to be collected for several variables 
mentioned above. Analyst forecast data are obtained from IBES Summary Statistics, and data on 
volatility index come from CBOE Indexes. Out of the 294 matched pairs of firms in the loan test 
sample, the required data are complete for 246 pairs. In total, there are 17,259 firm quarter 
observations used in this regression analysis with the earnings announcement period ranging 
from 1989 to 2010. 
Table 9 reports the results of this estimation. As shown in Table 9, Column 1, the 
coefficient on POSTMIS_RES is not significantly different from zero (= -0.003 and t = -
0.871); this suggests that equity prices of test and control firms do not respond differently to 
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earnings announcements during the misreporting period. The result does not change when the 
length of misreporting period is aligned with that of pre-misreporting period, which reduces the 
sample size to 8,216 observations.  remains not significantly different from zero, as reported in 
Column 2 of Table 9. This lends further evidence that, unlike bank lenders, equity holders are 
unaware of ongoing financial reporting misconduct during the misreporting period.  
Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Financial Misreporting 
The first validation test yields results consistent with banks acquiring and using 
information that is not available to equity investors during the misreporting period. To further 
examine the validity of the private information argument, I consider the issue of whether analysts 
are aware of ongoing financial misreporting by firms they follow. This is relevant because 
financial analysts play an important role as information intermediary to investors and it is 
possible that analysts use in their forecasts some information that investors fail to incorporate as 
quickly in equity pricing. If analysts do acquire information about ongoing misreporting, their 
use of such information would be reflected in forecast dispersion due to enhanced information 
uncertainty associated with the revelation of poor financial reporting quality (Palmrose et al. 
2004).  
The empirical model for this analysis is as follows: 
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 DISP is analyst forecast dispersion measured as the standard deviation of one-quarter-
ahead earnings forecast, scaled by prior quarter-end stock price. RES, POSTMIS, and 
POSTMIS_RES are the same variables as previously defined. Similar to previous tests, 
POSTMIS_RES is the main variable of interest and I expect to observe a significantly positive 
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(insignificant) 	if analysts (do not) acquire and use information about ongoing reporting 
irregularities during the misreporting period. This model also includes several other control 
variables as discussed in the prior literature (e.g., Bhushan 1989; Lang and Lundholm 1996): 
firm size (SIZE), return on assets (ROA), market-to-book ratio (MTB), and sales growth 
(GROWTH). 
 Data required for this analysis come from same sources discussed in previous sections. 
The final test sample contains 203 pairs of firms and a total number of 32,972 observations of 
analyst forecast dispersion in one-quarter-ahead earnings forecast from 1984 through 2010.  
As shown in Table 10, Column 1, the coefficient on POSTMIS_RES is not significantly 
different from zero. This indicates that the level of information uncertainty perceived by analysts 
does not change because of ongoing misreporting by firms they follow. Same result is obtained, 
as reported in Table 10, Column 2, when I further align the length of pre-misreporting period and 
that of misreporting period. This finding suggests that analysts do not appear to be aware of 
firms’ ongoing financial misreporting, which lends further evidence consistent with the private 
information argument about the response of bank lenders to financial misreporting by borrowers. 
Bond Interest Spread and Financial Misreporting 
While the results presented above are aligned with the notion that signals of ongoing 
misreporting are not available to equity investors or analysts, they provide no direct evidence to 
an alternative explanation that these signals could be available to debtholders only. Because of 
their asymmetric payoff function, debtholders are more concerned about downside risk than 
upside potential of a firm (Watts 2003). This could lead debtholders, as compared to equity 
investors, to pay closer attention to negative signals about a firm. As a result, information 
acquired by banks may not be available to shareholders or even financial analysts. To test this 
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alternative hypothesis, I examine the response of bondholders to new bonds issued by restating 
firms during the misreporting period. If bondholders also access and use the same signals 
acquired by banks about ongoing misreporting, then those signals are more likely to be public 
than private ones. On the other hand, the signals pertain to private information if they are not 
available to either equity investors or public debtholders.  
To conduct the analysis, I compare interest spreads on new bonds issued by restating and 
non-restating firms during the misreporting period. Observing significant (no significant) 
differences in bond interest spreads for these two groups would suggest that the information is 
available (not available) to bondholders and thus support the alternative (private information) 
hypothesis. 
The empirical model for the test of bond interest spreads is as follows: 
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 BONDSPREAD is the interest spread in basis points on the public bond over the interest 
rate on a treasury of similar maturity, divided by 100. RES, POSTMIS, and POSTMIS_RES are 
the same variables as previously defined. The main variable of interest here is the interaction 
term, POSTMIS_RES, which captures the difference-in-difference effect of financial 
misreporting on bond interest spreads. A positive and significant  would suggest that 
bondholders acquire and use signals about the borrowing firm’s financial misreporting in bond 
pricing. Contrarily, an insignificant  indicates that bondholders do not price public debts 
differently between bonds issued by restating firms and non-restating firms during the 
misreporting period. BONDMATURITY is the natural logarithm of bond maturity measured in 
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months. BONDSIZE is the natural logarithm of bond amount. SECURED is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the bond is secured with collateral and zero otherwise. Other firm-specific 
variables are the same as defined in Section III. This empirical model follows Bharath et al. 
(2008) and Shi and Zhang (2008), with some modifications.  
Bond data are collected from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD); other 
variables come from databases discussed in previous sections. The final test sample contains a 
total number of 892 new bond issues offered from 1981 to 2006 for 144 pairs of treatment and 
control firms.  
 Table 11 reports the estimation results, and the estimated coefficients on POSTMIS_RES 
are insignificant in both model specifications with and without bond-specific control variables (t 
statistics are -0.301 and -0.356, respectively). This suggests that bondholders, unlike banks, do 
not possess or use signals about financial reporting misconduct by borrowing firms during the 
misreporting period, a finding in line with banks acquiring private information related to the 
borrower’s ongoing financial misreporting. 
Audit Fees and Financial Misreporting 
The above analyses yield consistent results indicating banks’ acquisition of non-public 
signals related to the borrower’s ongoing misreporting. An indirect yet interesting question is 
whether auditors are also picking up some signals along the misreporting process. With their 
expertise in auditing financial statements, auditors are expected to detect the occurrence of 
financial misreporting in a timely manner. To shed some light on this question, I conduct an 
additional analysis and compare audit fees between restating and non-restating firms during the 
misreporting period using the difference-in-difference approach, as in previous tests. 
The empirical model is as follows: 
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LAF is the natural logarithm of audit fees. RES, POSTMIS, and POSTMIS_RES are the 
same as defined in previous sections. POSTMIS_RES is the main variable of interest as it 
captures the difference-in-difference effect of financial misreporting on audit fees. A positive 
and significant  would suggest that auditors charge higher fees for restating firms relative to 
non-restating firms during the misreporting period. On the contrary, an insignificant  would 
suggest that auditors do not price audit services differently between restating firms and non-
restating firms during this period.  
The selection of control variables follows prior literature on audit fees (e.g., Francis et al. 
2005). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LSEG is the natural logarithm of the number 
of business segments. CATA is the current ratio measured as current assets divided by total 
assets. QUICK is the quick ratio calculated as quick assets divided by total assets. DE is the debt-
to-equity ratio measured as long-term debt divided by shareholders’ equity. ROI is earnings 
before interest and tax deflated by total assets. YE is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
fiscal year end is not December and 0 otherwise. OPINION is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if the firm receives a non-standard audit opinion. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
auditor is one of the big 4 audit firms.  
Audit fee data come from Audit Analytics; other variables are from databases discussed 
in early sections. The final sample contains 1,843 firm-year observations for the period from 
2000 to 2009.  
As reported in Table 12, the estimated coefficient on POSTMIS_RES is positive but 
insignificant ( = 0.073 and t = 1.173), suggesting that auditors do not seem to possess 
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information about auditees’ ongoing financial misreporting28. While this result is somewhat 
surprising, there are two possible explanations for it. First, it is likely that auditors access client 
information through different channels from banks, which contributes to their acquisition of 
different information sets. Second, banks and auditors could have different materiality thresholds 
in their judgment and decision-making. This could explain why banks and auditors may respond 
to same signals differently (if both parties possess the same information).  
Characteristics of Eventual Restatement and Loan Pricing during the Misreporting Period 
The results that have been discussed so far indicate that banks respond to financial 
misreporting by borrowing firms at an early stage that precedes the eventual announcement of 
restatement. One related issue is whether banks are aware of the financial misreporting in a 
“general sense” (i.e., the lender observes some signals about the borrower’s information 
problems in financial reporting but does not have access to specific details) or in a “specific 
manner” (i.e., the lender has access to some information with specific details about ongoing 
financial misreporting).  
To examine this question, I use ex post information about the reasons of restatement and 
partition the sample into two categories: core and non-core restatements. More specifically, 
restatements associated with revenue-recognition or expense-recording issues are categorized as 
core restatements because these restatements usually affect components of pre-tax operating 
income. Restatements associated with other issues are categorized as non-core restatements.29  
As prior studies suggest, core restatements are viewed as more severe to financial 
statement users than non-core restatements (Palmrose et al. 2004, Scholz 2008, Burks 2011). 
                                                        
28
 In an untabulated analysis, I use change in audit fees as the dependent variable and get similar results.  
29
 A restatement usually involves multiple issues (Scholz, 2008). On average, each restatement in my sample is 
associated with about three different issues. To be inclusive, I categorize the restatement as a core-restatement as 
long as revenue-recognition or expense recording is one of the issues associated with that restatement. However, this 
procedure is biased against finding results if a restatement includes both core and non-core issues. 
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Therefore, I test whether banks respond to these two subsamples differently during the 
misreporting period, which can shed light on the extent to which banks are aware of the financial 
misreporting by their clients. 
For this analysis, Equation (1) is estimated for the two sub-samples of core and non-core 
restatements. As reported in Table 13, the coefficients on POSTMIS_RES in both sub-samples 
are significantly positive, which is consistent with previous results that banks charge higher 
interest rate spreads for restating firms as compared to control firms. In terms the estimated 
coefficient’s magnitude, the coefficient on POSTMIS_RES in the core restatement sub-sample 
( = 0.246) is slightly larger than the coefficient on POSTMIS_RES in the non-core restatement 
sub-sample (	= 0.200). However, the difference between these two estimated coefficients is 
not statistically significant (p = 0.84). Therefore, there is insufficient empirical evidence to make 
inferences on the level of information to which banks have access with respect to borrowers’ 
ongoing financial misreporting. 
Accrual Quality-based Matching 
 As discussed in previous sections about research design and sample selection, each 
restating firm is matched to a non-restating control firm of similar size in the same two-digit SIC 
industry. While this matching procedure follows prior literature on restatements (Graham et al. 
2008, Desai et al. 2006), the use of an additional matching variable needs to be considered in 
light of an alternative explanation that banks could in fact use accrual quality, which is publicly 
available information, as a signal of potential misreporting and adjust loan contractual terms 
accordingly.  
To address this issue, I add an accrual-based variable as the third matching criterion. 
Under this additional requirement, matched pairs of restating and non-restating firms will have a 
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similar level of accrual quality in addition to the matched size and industry. If significant 
differences in loan pricing for this new matched sample continue to exist during the misreporting 
period, I can attribute the results to banks using private information rather than reacting to public 
signals such as accrual quality. 
 For this analysis, I use working capital accruals as the accrual measure to construct a new 
match sample. This particular accrual measure is adopted for two reasons. First, Dechow et al. 
(2011) use working capital accruals as one of their accrual quality measures and find significant 
differences in this variable between misstatement and non-misstatement firm years. Second, this 
measure is not subject to the same degree of estimation error commonly associated with other 
discretionary accrual measures. According to Allen et al. (2009) and Dechow et al. (2011), 
working capital accruals are calculated as follows: 
WACC = Change in current assets (ACTQ) – change in cash (CHEQ) – change in current 
liabilities (LCTQ) + change in debt in current liabilities (DLCQ) + change in income 
taxes payable (TXPQ), scaled by average total assets. 
After the variable is constructed, each restating firm is matched to a control firm in the 
same two-digit SIC industry with the smallest difference in firm size and working capital 
accruals at the fiscal quarter end prior to the beginning of misreporting period.30  
 This matching procedure creates a new sample of 2,093 loan facilities for 248 matched 
pairs of firms, and Table 14, Column 1 presents test results on the association between loan 
pricing and misreporting (i.e., Equation [1]) using this sample. The estimated coefficient on 
                                                        
30
 Because there are two continuous matching variables (i.e., firm size and accruals), I follow the method in Huang 
and Stoll (1996) and Desai et al. (2006) to create a deviation score for each potential matching firm. The deviation 
score is calculated as follows: 
 Deviation Score = [ ?@
AB?@C
(?@AE?@C)/
] +	[
I?JJABI?JJC
(I?JJAEI?JJC)/
] 
where t and m represent treatment and matching firm values. For each treatment firm, I then sort the potential 
matching firms by the deviation score and keep the best match as the control firm.  
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POSTMIS_RES is positive (=0.198) and significant at 5% (t = 2.054). As shown in Table 14, 
Column 2, same results hold for a modification of the variable construction, which uses the 
accrual measure at the quarter end after the inception of misreporting as the matching variable.31 
These findings suggest that banks respond to signals beyond what is contained in publicly 
available information such as accrual quality; this further supports the argument that banks 
appear to acquire and use private information about ongoing financial misreporting by borrowers 
in making lending decisions. 
The Effect of Continuous Lending Relationships 
When banks develop close relationships with borrowers over time, the proximity between 
the bank and the borrower should facilitate monitoring and screening and reduce the information 
asymmetry problem (Boot 2000). Prior transactions would have allowed lenders to gather 
proprietary inside information about borrowers (Bharath et al. 2008). Accordingly, if banks have 
access to private information about their clients, this capacity is likely to increase as the lending 
relationship between banks and borrowers continues.  
To investigate whether past lending relationships play a significant role in banks’ 
acquisition and use of information related to financial misreporting, I segregate bank loans made 
to restating firms into relationship loans and non-relationship loans and examine the association 
between lending relationships and loan pricing during the misreporting period. Following Dahya 
et al. (2003) and Bharath et al. (2008), I identify the lead bank(s) on each loan facility and 
classify a bank loan as a relationship loan if the borrower has another bank loan issued by the 
same lead bank(s) during the past five years.32 Otherwise, a loan facility is classified as a non-
                                                        
31
 This alternative matching is used to match firms based on their accrual quality during the misreporting period. 
32
 As in Bharath et al. (2008), I classify a bank as a lead bank in a loan if it (1) is accorded the role of lead arranger 
credit or (2) is accorded one of the following four roles and retains a significant share of the loan (> 25%): agent, 
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relationship loan.  
With the identification of relationship loans, the following empirical model is employed: 
 =
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REL is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan facility is a relationship loan and 0 if 
it is a non-relationship loan. POSTMIS_REL, the interaction term of POSTMIS and REL, is the 
main test variable as it captures the difference-in-difference effect of past lending relationships 
on loan pricing during the misreporting period. All other variables are the same as previously 
defined. 
Table 15 reports the estimation results. Column 1 shows the results using the standard 
size- and industry-matched sample, and Column 2 presents the results using the size-, industry-, 
and accrual quality-matched sample. The significant and positive  in both regressions suggest 
that banks having past lending relationships with restating firms charge higher interest rates on 
loans issued to those firms during the misreporting period as compared to lenders with no prior 
relationships with restating firms. This finding implies that lending relationships seem to 
facilitate banks’ acquisition of private information related to financial misreporting, which is 
consistent with the argument that relationship lending mitigates the information asymmetry 
between banks and borrowers. 
Other Robustness Tests 
To further validate the main results of this study, several additional tests are conducted to 
check robustness. First, a system of equations is estimated using the seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) procedure to address the concern that price and nonprice terms of loan 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
administrative agent, arranger, lead bank. Because loan prices are compared between pre-misreporting and 
misreporting period, I also require that the start date of misreporting be within the five-year horizon. 
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contracts, to some extent, could be jointly determined during the loan process.33 As reported in 
Table 16, the estimated coefficients on POSTMIS_RES from all three models are statistically 
significant in directions consistent with testing hypotheses. Second, untabulated results reveal 
that the effect of misreporting on loan interest spread is not affected by the exclusion of two 
potential endogenous variables, loan facility size and loan maturity, from the regression models. 
Third, the loan-pricing regression is re-estimated at the deal level by selecting the largest 
loan facility in each loan package. Results (unreported) obtained from this deal-level estimation 
are similar to those of the facility-level regressions. Finally, same results hold for the loan-
pricing test if the length of the pre-misreporting period and the misreporting period are aligned 
(i.e., it is required that loans be issued within two years prior to the inception of misreporting if 
the financial misreporting spans two years).  
  
                                                        
33
 As Kim et al. (2011) point out, however, prior literature on syndicated loans suggests that nonprice terms of loans 
are usually determined before the settlement of loan interest rate during the process (e.g., Dennis and Mullineaux 
2000, Bharath et al. 2009). 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates whether banks, as inside debt holders, are able to acquire and 
process information about ongoing financial reporting misconduct by borrowing firms and 
reflect this information in their lending decisions during the misreporting period. For this 
analysis, the misreporting period refers to the pre-disclosure period when the errors were made. 
For a sample of 3,142 loan facilities initiated in both the pre-misreporting and misreporting 
periods, the price and nonprice terms of loan contracts are compared between restating firms and 
non-restating firms. Three sets of control variables are used: loan-specific, borrower-specific, 
and economy-wide factors, which are known determinants of contractual terms in bank loans.  
The results show that loans issued to restating firms during the misreporting period are 
associated with a higher interest cost than loans made to non-restating firms during the same 
period. These results are obtained after controlling for other determinants of borrowing cost. 
With respect to nonprice terms of the loans, banks impose more restrictive financial covenants 
on loans issued to restating firms than on those made to non-restating firms during the 
misreporting period. Loans issued to restating firms during the misreporting period also have 
shorter maturities as compared to loans made to non-restating firms. These findings suggest that 
banks appear to acquire signals about ongoing financial misreporting by borrowers and tailor 
terms of new loan contracts accordingly to reflect the added risk(s) caused by such information 
problems. 
To validate the main test results, several additional analyses are conducted. These 
analyses show that (1) there is no significant difference in equity investors’ response to earnings 
announcements between restating and non-restating firms during the misreporting period, (2) 
there is no significant change in analyst forecast dispersion during the misreporting period, and 
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(3) other public debtholders, i.e., bondholders, also do not price new bond issues differently for 
restating and non-restating firms. Together, these findings suggest that the signals banks acquire 
about borrowers’ ongoing financial misreporting are not available to either equity-market 
participants or public debtholders during the misreporting period. Overall, the results of this 
study indicate that banks appear to be aware of and responsive to financial reporting misconduct 
by borrowers in a timelier manner than investors, equity analysts, and bondholders. These results 
are also robust to different model specifications, additional matching requirements, and several 
other robustness checks. 
This paper adds to the literature on restatements by examining banks’ acquisition and use 
of private signals about ongoing misreporting by borrowers. The use of information by bank 
lenders in setting terms of new loan contracts during the misreporting period extends our 
understanding of the impact of events preceding restatement announcements. This study also 
complements finance literature on banks’ superior access to borrower information by providing 
evidence on the ability of banks in acquiring and processing information in a unique setting. 
Financial misreporting provides an interesting setting because borrowers have incentives to hide 
information from their lenders when issuing misstated financial statements. Furthermore, a 
practical implication offered by this study is that restating firms could incur the cost of financial 
misreporting well before they announce the restatement publicly.  
There are several limitations of this study. First, this paper uses restated accounting 
numbers in the analysis because originally reported numbers are not available from the data 
sources. The discrepancy between restated numbers and original values might affect estimation 
results because of measurement errors in some explanatory variables.34 Second, the earnings 
                                                        
34
 However, it is unknown how the difference in restated and original numbers would affect my results. Besides, if 
banks are aware of ongoing financial misreporting, it is reasonable to assume that they will also adjust their use of 
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impact of financial misreporting in each period is not available. Third, this paper uses a 
restatement sample from Audit Analytics for the period 2000 to 2010, even though other sources 
of restatement information (e.g., GAO reports) exist. Therefore, further replication is desired in 
order to generalize the empirical results documented here to other restatement samples or to 
other periods. Lastly, there could be other factors, in addition to what this study has attempted to 
control for, that lead to the differences between bank lenders’ and other capital providers’ 
response to ongoing misreporting by a firm. For example, Hirst et al. (2003) suggest that 
investors have prior expectations about opportunistic reporting of a firm and these expectations 
are priced before the confirmation of opportunistic reporting. As a result, equity investors may 
also receive information about ongoing misreporting but do not respond simply because they 
have already factored the “expected misreporting” into their decisions. To my knowledge, there 
is no empirical evidence on prior knowledge of banks about borrowers’ opportunistic reporting. 
This topic would present a good opportunity for future research. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
reported accounting numbers in loan contracting. Therefore, my conjecture is that the results should not be affected 
if the original numbers are used in the analysis. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1 Timeline of Financial Misreporting 
 
This figure illustrates the timeline around financial misreporting. The period between starting 
date and ending date of misreporting is defined as the “Misreporting Period” (T1) during which 
firms issue misstated financial statements. The period prior to the beginning of misreporting is 
the “Pre-Misreporting Period” (T0), while the period after the public announcement of 
restatement is defined as the “Post-Restatement Period” (T2).  
 
 
 
 
  
Star ng Date Ending Date 
Restatement   
Announcement 
Date 
Misrepor ng 
Period 
Post-Restatement 
Period 
Pre-Misrepor ng 
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T0 T1 T2 
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Table 1 Research Design 
 
This table shows the structure of my research design, which is a matched-pair comparison of 
bank loan terms across misreporting and pre-misreporting period. 
 
 Pre-Misreporting 
Period 
T0 
Misreporting  
Period 
T1 
Restating Firm 
(Experiment Group) X0,i X1,i 
Non-restating Firm 
(Control Group) C0,i C1,i 
 
Restating firm: the firm that subsequently announces restatement of previously issued financial 
statements. 
 
Non-restating firm: the firm that has no restatement announcement and is matched to the 
restating firm based on (a) same two-digit SIC industry code, and (b) firm size. 
 
The main test is to compare terms of bank loans made to restating firms (X1) and non-restating 
firms (C1) during the misreporting period (T1) and examine the difference (i.e. X1,i – C1,i ).  
 
The three loan terms, denoted as i, are: 
1. Loan interest rate spread, 
2. Number of financial covenants, 
3. Loan maturity. 
 
To isolate the effect of financial misreporting from other factors that could also lead to 
differences in loan terms between restating firms, I also compare the terms of bank loans made to 
restating firms (X0) and non-restating firms (C0) during the pre-misreporting period (T0) and use 
the difference (i.e. X0,i – C0,i) as the control. 
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Table 2 Sample Selection and Distribution 
 
This table describes the selection process of my sample with restatements filed in the period 
2000-2010, the characteristics of the final 294 restating firms, and the distribution of a total 
number of 3,142 loan facilities in the final sample of 588 firms (294 matched-pair of restating 
and non-restating firms). 
   
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 Number of 
Restating Firms  
 Number of Loan 
Facilities  
Audit Analytics restatement sample 10,815  
Less: multiple restatements (3,871) 
Less: financial companies (1,072) 
Less: firms without DealScan loan data, Compustat data, 
or CRSP data (4,351) 
Less: firms without data in both pre-misreporting and 
misreporting period*  (1,142) 
Less: firms without matched pair (85) 
Final sample of restating firms 294  1,694  
Final sample of restating and non-restating firms 588  3,142  
*
 Similar to Graham et al. (2008), I require that each restating firm have loan observations in 
both the pre-misreporting and during-misreporting period in order to make fair comparison 
between debt contracts between these two periods. 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Restating Firms by Filing Year 
Year 
Number of  
restating firms Percentage 
2000 16 5.4% 
2001 15 5.1% 
2002 19 6.5% 
2003 35 11.9% 
2004 39 13.3% 
2005 77 26.2% 
2006 37 12.6% 
2007 24 8.2% 
2008 16 5.4% 
2009 10 3.4% 
2010 6 2.0% 
294 100.0% 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
 
Panel C: Distribution of Restating Firms by Industry 
Fama-French 17 Industry 
Number of  
restating firms Percentage 
Food 14 4.8% 
Mining and Minerals 1 0.3% 
Oil and Petroleum Products 26 8.8% 
Textiles, Apparel & Footware 6 2.0% 
Consumer Durables 8 2.7% 
Chemicals 8 2.7% 
Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 12 4.1% 
Construction and Construction 
Materials 5 1.7% 
Steel Works 7 2.4% 
Fabricated Products 4 1.4% 
Machinery and Business Equipment 32 10.9% 
Automobiles 5 1.7% 
Transportation 7 2.4% 
Utilities 7 2.4% 
Retail Stores 42 14.3% 
Other 110 37.4% 
294 100.0% 
 
Panel D: Distribution of Loan Facilities by Restating and Non-Restating 
Firms across Pre-Misreporting and Misreporting Period 
   
Number of Loan Facilities 
Pre-Misreporting 
Period 
Misreporting  
Period Total 
Restating Firms 1,042 652 1,694 
Non-Restating Firms 906 542 1,448 
1,948 1,194 3,142 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics on main variables, including loan-specific 
characteristics, borrower-specific characteristics, and macroeconomic factors, for the 
3,142 loan facilities.   
 
Panel A: Loan Facility Characteristics 
 
Variables N Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75 
AIS (%) 3,142 1.763 1.365 0.750 1.500 2.500 
MATURITY (months) 3,142 45.688 27.126 24.000 48.000 60.000 
LMATURITY 3,142 3.599 0.749 3.178 3.871 4.094 
LOANSIZE (millions) 3,142 286.935 634.789 50.000 145.443 300.000 
LLOANSIZE 3,142 18.575 1.466 17.728 18.795 19.519 
PPRICING 3,142 0.519 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
NLENDER 3,142 8.883 10.559 2.000 6.000 12.000 
SYNDICATION 3,083 0.944 0.230 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
 
Variables N Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75 
RES 3,142 0.539 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
POSTMIS 3,142 0.380 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 3,142 6.799 1.639 5.621 6.756 7.913 
LEVERAGE 3,142 0.313 0.172 0.191 0.303 0.425 
MTB 3,142 3.283 4.409 1.404 2.170 3.496 
PROFITABILITY 3,142 0.034 0.032 0.021 0.033 0.048 
GROWTH 3,142 0.190 0.473 -0.002 0.091 0.226 
ALTMANZ 3,142 3.480 2.427 1.812 4.430 4.743 
CFVOLATILITY 3,142 0.029 0.030 0.012 0.020 0.033 
TANGIBILITY 3,142 0.329 0.235 0.151 0.259 0.457 
RETURN 3,142 0.062 0.271 -0.094 0.036 0.171 
 
Panel C: Macroeconomic Factors 
 
Variables N Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75 
CSPREAD 3,142 0.838 0.227 0.680 0.790 0.920 
TSPREAD 3,142 0.951 0.887 0.200 0.610 1.870 
      See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 4 Univariate Comparisons of Loan and Firm Characteristics 
With the total number of 3,142 loan facilities divided into two periods: misreporting (1,194 
loans) and pre-misreporting (1,948 loans), this table reports the comparison of main variables on 
loan facilities between restating and non-restating firms in these two periods. Panel A compares 
the loans made during the misreporting period, and Panel B compares the loans in the pre-
misreporting period. 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Non-Restating Firms versus Restating Firms (misreporting period) 
      
 
(1 ) Non-Restating Firms (2) Restating Firms 
 
(2) - (1) 
Variables N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
 
t  z  
AIS (%) 542 1.767 1.500 
 
652 2.071 1.750 
 
3.54*** 3.85*** 
LEVERAGE 542 0.279 0.275 
 
652 0.330 0.319 
 
4.97*** 4.35*** 
PROFITABILITY 542 0.032 0.034 
 
652 0.030 0.029 
 
-1.08 -3.25*** 
SIZE 542 6.966 6.956 
 
652 7.206 7.225 
 
2.61*** 2.71*** 
GROWTH 542 0.115 0.071 
 
652 0.148 0.069 
 
1.45 0.25 
MTB 542 3.278 2.107 
 
652 3.052 2.189 
 
-0.90 -0.22 
ALTMANZ 542 3.597 4.423 
 
652 3.179 4.343 
 
-2.77*** -2.96*** 
CFVOLATILITY 542 0.030 0.021 
 
652 0.026 0.018 
 
-2.49** -3.06*** 
TANGIBILITY 542 0.299 0.224 
 
652 0.327 0.254 
 
2.05** 1.99** 
RETURN 542 0.058 0.041 
 
652 0.058 0.020 
 
0.03 -0.79 
MATURITY (months) 542 44.605 48.000 
 
652 48.538 48.000 
 
2.68*** 1.68* 
LMATURITY 542 3.598 3.871 
 
652 3.700 3.871 
 
2.54** 1.68* 
LOANSIZE (millions) 542 343.769 150.000 
 
652 330.859 175.000 
 
-0.26 0.03 
LLOANSIZE 542 18.751 18.826 
 
652 18.762 18.980 
 
0.14 0.03 
PPRICING 542 0.579 1.000 
 
652 0.600 1.000 
 
0.71 0.71 
NLENDER 542 10.009 7.000 
 
652 9.479 7.000 
 
-0.74 0.51 
           Panel B: Non-Restating Firms versus Restating Firms (pre-misreporting period) 
      
 
(1 ) Non-Restating Firms (2) Restating Firms 
 
(2) - (1) 
Variables N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
 
t  z  
AIS (%) 906 1.584 1.250 
 
1,042 1.723 1.500 
 
2.41** 2.57*** 
LEVERAGE 906 0.304 0.293 
 
1,042 0.327 0.317 
 
2.91*** 2.94*** 
PROFITABILITY 906 0.034 0.033 
 
1,042 0.036 0.037 
 
1.24 1.97** 
SIZE 906 6.631 6.567 
 
1,042 6.604 6.487 
 
-0.37 -0.63 
GROWTH 906 0.184 0.093 
 
1,042 0.259 0.110 
 
3.19*** 3.52*** 
MTB 906 3.313 2.166 
 
1,042 3.403 2.212 
 
0.45 0.76 
ALTMANZ 906 3.705 4.496 
 
1,042 3.412 4.435 
 
-2.80*** -4.26*** 
CFVOLATILITY 906 0.032 0.020 
 
1,042 0.027 0.019 
 
-3.76*** -3.30*** 
TANGIBILITY 906 0.316 0.247 
 
1,042 0.355 0.298 
 
3.73*** 3.48*** 
RETURN 906 0.048 0.025 
 
1,042 0.077 0.046 
 
2.36** 1.89** 
MATURITY (months) 906 41.737 36.000 
 
1,042 47.904 50.000 
 
4.85*** 4.45*** 
LMATURITY 906 3.482 3.584 
 
1,042 3.639 3.912 
 
4.46*** 4.45*** 
LOANSIZE (millions) 906 246.187 116.178 
 
1,042 265.318 125.000 
 
0.96 0.70 
LLOANSIZE 906 18.440 18.571 
 
1,042 18.484 18.644 
 
0.64 0.70 
PPRICING 906 0.451 0.000 
 
1,042 0.496 0.000 
 
1.97** 1.97** 
NLENDER 906 8.089 5.000 
 
1,042 8.615 6.000 
 
1.25 0.54 
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Table 6 Loan Spread and Misreporting 
 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
  
 
OLS Regression with Dependent Variable = AIS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RES 0.111** 0.043 0.030 0.028 0.028 
 
(1.964) (0.937) (0.731) (0.691) (0.371) 
POSTMIS -0.046 -0.032 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 
(-0.561) (-0.504) (-0.231) (-0.225) (-0.175) 
POSTMIS_RES 0.195* 0.217*** 0.162** 0.160** 0.160* 
 
(1.940) (2.627) (2.192) (2.160) (1.832) 
LEVERAGE 
 
1.680*** 1.159*** 1.174*** 1.174*** 
  
(11.473) (8.716) (8.872) (5.085) 
PROFITABILITY 
 
-5.772*** -4.558*** -4.589*** -4.589*** 
  
(-5.785) (-5.132) (-5.207) (-3.015) 
SIZE 
 
-0.379*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.153*** 
  
(-28.316) (-6.077) (-6.075) (-3.496) 
GROWTH 
 
0.204*** 0.151*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 
  
(4.626) (3.969) (4.084) (4.131) 
MTB 
 
-0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  
(-0.795) (-0.532) (-0.533) (-0.316) 
ALTMANZ 
 
-0.097*** -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.087*** 
  
(-6.713) (-7.634) (-7.548) (-5.872) 
CFVOLATILITY 
 
2.591*** 3.586*** 3.578*** 3.578*** 
  
(2.938) (4.929) (4.922) (4.120) 
TANGIBILITY 
 
0.077 0.063 0.059 0.059 
  
(0.665) (0.608) (0.565) (0.289) 
RETURN 
 
0.438*** 0.345*** 0.348*** 0.348** 
  
(4.073) (3.749) (3.771) (2.457) 
LMATURITY 
  
-0.100* -0.097* -0.097 
   
(-1.939) (-1.887) (-1.363) 
LLOANSIZE 
  
-0.187*** -0.188*** -0.188*** 
   
(-6.443) (-6.470) (-4.720) 
PPRICING 
  
-0.313*** -0.311*** -0.311*** 
   
(-7.389) (-7.366) (-5.240) 
LNLENDER 
  
-0.015 -0.016 -0.016 
   
(-0.609) (-0.621) (-0.443) 
SYNDICATION 
  
0.010 0.006 0.006 
   
(0.081) (0.048) (0.046) 
CSPREAD 
   
-0.274 -0.274 
    
(-1.456) (-1.480) 
TSPREAD 
   
0.141** 0.141 
    
(2.119) (1.600) 
Intercept 1.185*** 2.263*** 4.616*** 4.890*** 4.890*** 
 
(11.497) (12.494) (9.827) (9.353) (8.728) 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Loan Purpose and Type fixed effect no no yes yes yes 
Firm and year clustering adjusted 
standard error no no no no yes 
Number of observations 3,142 3,142 3,083 3,083 3,083 
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.375 0.521 0.522 0.522 
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Table 7 Financial Covenants and Misreporting 
 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
Poisson Regression with Dependent Variable = FINCOV 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RES 0.014 -0.014 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 
 
(0.488) (-0.538) (-0.730) (-0.745) (-0.640) 
POSTMIS -0.029 -0.019 -0.037 -0.035 -0.035 
 
(-0.808) (-0.557) (-1.156) (-1.123) (-1.073) 
POSTMIS_RES 0.082* 0.098** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.099** 
 
(1.889) (2.400) (2.606) (2.587) (2.480) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.449*** 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 
  
(6.469) (3.309) (3.335) (2.736) 
PROFITABILITY 
 
0.168 0.036 0.035 0.035 
  
(0.599) (0.130) (0.124) (0.116) 
SIZE 
 
-0.091*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
  
(-11.793) (-4.081) (-4.129) (-3.385) 
GROWTH 
 
0.015 0.014 0.016 0.016 
  
(0.529) (0.524) (0.592) (0.578) 
MTB 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.387) (0.437) (0.429) (0.407) 
ALTMANZ 
 
-0.008* -0.010** -0.010** -0.010* 
  
(-1.645) (-2.030) (-2.010) (-1.806) 
CFVOLATILITY 
 
-1.102*** -0.873** -0.884** -0.884** 
  
(-2.875) (-2.302) (-2.330) (-2.002) 
TANGIBILITY 
 
-0.097* -0.104* -0.105* -0.105 
  
(-1.693) (-1.933) (-1.955) (-1.358) 
RETURN 
 
0.057 0.018 0.018 0.018 
  
(1.577) (0.507) (0.499) (0.519) 
LMATURITY 
  
0.025 0.026 0.026 
   
(0.911) (0.937) (0.888) 
LLOANSIZE 
  
-0.062*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 
   
(-3.134) (-3.147) (-2.850) 
PPRICING 
  
0.042 0.042 0.042 
   
(1.601) (1.598) (1.426) 
LNLENDER 
  
0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 
   
(2.000) (2.000) (1.969) 
SYNDICATION 
  
0.102* 0.101* 0.101* 
   
(1.928) (1.905) (1.734) 
CSPREAD 
   
-0.126 -0.126 
    
(-1.122) (-1.121) 
TSPREAD 
   
0.040 0.040 
    
(1.079) (1.032) 
Intercept 0.626* 1.332*** 1.940*** 2.145*** 2.145*** 
 
(1.774) (2.900) (3.632) (4.120) (3.917) 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Loan Purpose and Type fixed effect no no yes yes yes 
Firm and year clustering adjusted standard 
error 
no no no no yes 
Number of observations 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.026 0.041 0.041 0.041 
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Table 8 Loan Maturity and Misreporting 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions.  
                                                       OLS Regression with Dependent Variable = LMATURITY 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RES 0.136*** 0.111*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056* 
 
(3.861) (3.166) (2.699) (2.656) (1.822) 
POSTMIS 0.089* 0.099** 0.065** 0.064** 0.064* 
 
(1.949) (2.230) (2.512) (2.489) (1.810) 
POSTMIS_RES -0.043 -0.046 -0.075** -0.074** -0.074* 
 
(-0.805) (-0.878) (-2.459) (-2.405) (-1.857) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.710*** 0.056 0.052 0.052 
  
(8.145) (0.975) (0.912) (0.711) 
PROFITABILITY 
 
0.881** 0.864*** 0.845*** 0.845*** 
  
(2.057) (3.183) (3.098) (2.645) 
SIZE 
 
-0.035*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
  
(-3.815) (-1.037) (-1.034) (-0.842) 
GROWTH 
 
-0.012 -0.035 -0.036 -0.036* 
  
(-0.240) (-1.351) (-1.388) (-1.664) 
MTB 
 
-0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(-0.354) (0.012) (-0.016) (-0.015) 
ALTMANZ 
 
0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  
(0.335) (0.581) (0.583) (0.471) 
CFVOLATILITY 
 
-1.492*** -0.756** -0.750** -0.750 
  
(-2.839) (-2.421) (-2.414) (-1.544) 
TANGIBILITY 
 
0.139* 0.025 0.026 0.026 
  
(1.828) (0.539) (0.551) (0.451) 
RETURN 
 
0.172*** 0.045 0.045 0.045*** 
  
(3.520) (1.228) (1.229) (3.474) 
LLOANSIZE 
  
0.074*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
   
(6.321) (6.283) (5.547) 
PPRICING 
  
0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
   
(4.568) (4.553) (3.915) 
LNLENDER 
  
0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033** 
   
(2.725) (2.795) (2.059) 
SYNDICATION 
  
0.083 0.084 0.084 
   
(1.326) (1.337) (1.425) 
CSPREAD 
   
-0.039 -0.039 
    
(-0.466) (-0.426) 
TSPREAD 
   
-0.056* -0.056** 
    
(-1.814) (-2.107) 
Intercept 3.591*** 3.360*** 1.203*** 1.237*** 1.237*** 
 
(48.033) (30.265) (6.462) (5.897) (6.758) 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Loan Purpose and Type fixed effect no no yes yes yes 
Firm and year clustering adjusted standard 
error 
no no no no yes 
Number of observations 3,142 3,142 3,083 3,083 3,083 
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.088 0.690 0.690 0.690 
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Table 9 Earnings Announcement Returns during Misreporting Period 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. 
CRET is the size-adjusted, buy-and-hold stock return of a firm i measured over the three-day window (-1, 
+1) around the quarterly earnings announcement. RES is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the earnings 
announcement is made by a restating firm, and 0 if made by a non-restating firm. POSTMIS is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the earnings announcement is made during the misreporting period, and 0 
if made in the pre-misreporting period. POSTMIS_RES is the interaction term. SIZE is the firm size 
measured as natural logarithm of total assets. MBE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the actual earnings 
are equal to or higher than the most recent mean analyst forecast, and 0 otherwise. ESURPRISE is 
measured as the difference between the actual earnings and the most recent mean analyst forecast, scaled 
by stock price. VOLATILITY_INDEX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s volatility index on the 
day before earnings announcement. 
  
 OLS with Dependent Variable=CRET 
Variable (1) (2) 
RES -0.000 -0.003 
 (-0.356) (-1.634) 
POSTMIS -0.000 -0.002 
 (-0.185) (-0.778) 
POSTMIS_RES -0.003 -0.001 
 
(-0.871) (-0.268) 
SIZE -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 
(-3.497) (-3.586) 
MBE 0.027*** 0.031*** 
 
(14.176) (11.084) 
ESURPRISE 0.415** 0.208 
 
(2.541) (1.170) 
VOLATILITY_INDEX -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 
(-4.347) (-3.351) 
Intercept 0.001 -0.024*** 
 
(0.090) (-2.932) 
Year fixed effect yes yes 
Industry fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 17,259 8,216 
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.035 
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Table 10 Analyst Forecast Dispersion during Misreporting Period 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year level clustering.  
DISP is analyst forecast dispersion measured as the standard deviation of one-quarter-ahead earnings 
forecast, scaled by prior quarter-end stock price. RES is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the analyst 
earnings forecasts are made for a restating firm and equals to 0 if made for a non-restating firm. 
POSTMIS is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the analyst earnings forecasts are made during the 
misreporting period and equals 0 if made in the pre-misreporting period. POSTMIS_RES is the interaction 
term. ROA is EBITDA/total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. MTB is market value of 
equity/book value of common shareholders’ equity. GROWTH is the growth of total sales measured in 
percentage.   
  
 
OLS with Dependent Variable=DISP 
RES -0.00012 0.00008 
 
(-0.749) (0.356) 
POSTMIS -0.00008 0.00009 
 
(-0.375) (0.642) 
POSTMIS_RES 0.00022 0.00002 
 
(0.879) (0.082) 
ROA -0.01879***  -0.01937***  
 
(-9.331) (-9.439) 
SIZE -0.00013***  -0.00014***  
 
(-2.793) (-2.845) 
MTB -0.00003 -0.00003**  
 
(-1.591) (-2.569) 
GROWTH -0.00044***  -0.00043**  
 
(-3.199) (-2.171) 
Intercept 0.00255***  0.00401***  
 
(6.297) (8.447) 
Year fixed effect yes yes 
Industry fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 32,320 14,576 
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.127 
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Table 11 Bond Interest Spread during Misreporting Period 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year level clustering.  
BONDSPREAD is the interest spread in basis points on the public bond over the interest rate on a treasury 
of similar maturity, divided by 100. BONDMATURITY is the natural logarithm of bond maturity 
measured in months. BONDSIZE is the natural logarithm of bond amount. SECURED is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the bond is secured with collateral and 0 otherwise. Other variables are the same 
as defined in Appendix A.  
  
 
OLS with Dependent Variable=BONDSPREAD 
RES 0.072 0.078 
 
(0.572) (0.665) 
POSTMIS 0.051 0.046 
 
(0.232) (0.201) 
POSTMIS_RES -0.080 -0.101 
 
(-0.301) (-0.356) 
LEVERAGE 0.812 0.831* 
 
(1.628) (1.818) 
SIZE -0.304*** -0.345*** 
 
(-6.848) (-3.781) 
PROFITABILITY -5.071*** -5.046*** 
 
(-2.747) (-3.536) 
MTB -0.066*** -0.069** 
 
(-2.724) (-2.024) 
GROWTH 0.274** 0.255 
 
(2.051) (1.606) 
ALTMANZ -0.145*** -0.142** 
 
(-2.938) (-2.365) 
TANGIBILITY 0.358 0.388 
 
(1.164) (1.443) 
BONDMATURITY 
 
0.011 
  
(0.243) 
BONDSIZE 
 
0.130* 
  
(1.858) 
SECURED 
 
-0.042 
  
(-0.153) 
Intercept 2.418*** 1.297 
 
(3.957) (0.985) 
Year fixed effect yes yes 
Industry fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 892 892 
Adjusted R2 0.537 0.537 
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Table 12 Audit Fees during Misreporting Period 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year level clustering.  
LAF is the natural logarithm of audit fees. LTA is the natural logarithm of total assets. CATA is current 
assets/total assets. QUICK is (current assets-inventory)/total assets. DE is debt-to-equity ratio. ROI is 
EBIT/total assets. YE is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fiscal year end month is not December. 
OPINION is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the client receives a non-standard audit opinion and 0 
otherwise. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the auditor is one of the big 4 firms and 0 
otherwise. LSEG is the natural logarithm of number of business segments. Other variables are the same as 
defined in Appendix A. 
  
 
OLS with Dependent Variable=LAF 
RES -0.068 
 
(-1.155) 
POSTMIS -0.083 
 
(-1.614) 
POSTMIS_RES 0.073 
 
(1.173) 
LTA 0.568*** 
 
(32.904) 
CATA 1.009*** 
 
(7.200) 
QUICK -0.074*** 
 
(-3.815) 
DE 0.049 
 
(0.380) 
ROI -0.620*** 
 
(-3.401) 
YE -0.225*** 
 
(-4.720) 
OPINION 0.021 
 
(0.630) 
BIG4 -0.122 
 
(-0.937) 
LSEG 0.125*** 
 
(3.807) 
Intercept 9.049*** 
 
(44.974) 
Year fixed effect yes 
Industry fixed effect yes 
Number of observations 1,843 
Adjusted R2 0.796 
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Table 13 Loan Spread and Type of Restatement 
 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 OLS Regression with Dependent Variable = AIS 
Variable Core Restatement Non-Core Restatement 
RES -0.036 0.046 
 
(-0.355) (0.805) 
POSTMIS -0.256** 0.010 
 
(-2.069) (0.130) 
POSTMIS_RES 0.246* 0.200** 
 
(1.700) (2.144) 
LEVERAGE 1.121*** 1.472*** 
 
(4.256) (8.804) 
PROFITABILITY -6.992*** -4.266*** 
 
(-5.287) (-5.576) 
SIZE -0.217*** -0.102*** 
 
(-5.411) (-3.959) 
GROWTH 0.094 0.206*** 
 
(1.196) (4.212) 
MTB -0.009 0.000 
 
(-1.007) (0.010) 
ALTMANZ -0.074*** -0.127*** 
 
(-4.873) (-8.977) 
CFVOLATILITY 1.390 4.511*** 
 
(1.194) (4.326) 
TANGIBILITY 0.230 -0.281 
 
(0.954) (-0.227) 
RETURN 0.323*** 0.367*** 
 
(2.599) (4.234) 
LMATURITY -0.002 0.147*** 
 
(-0.038) (4.279) 
LLOANSIZE -0.259*** -0.232*** 
 
(-5.557) (-8.168) 
PPRICING -0.442*** -0.433*** 
 
(-5.266) (-8.612) 
LNLENDER 0.174*** -0.096*** 
 
(3.336) (-2.911) 
SYNDICATION -0.386 0.652 
 
(-0.403) (0.896) 
CSPREAD 0.033 -0.427 
 
(0.063) (-1.564) 
TSPREAD 0.002 0.262*** 
 
(0.015) (2.895) 
Intercept 7.044*** 7.099*** 
 
(4.203) (6.232) 
Year fixed effect yes yes 
Industry fixed effect yes yes 
Loan purpose fixed effect yes yes 
Loan type fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 745 2,157 
Adjusted R2 0.555 0.454 
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Table 14 Loan Spread and Misreporting - Accrual Quality-Based Matching 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
OLS Regression with Dependent Variable = AIS 
Variable ACC1 ACC2 
RES 0.021 0.072 
 
(0.379) (1.441) 
POSTMIS -0.112 -0.151**  
 
(-1.350) (-2.430) 
POSTMIS_RES 0.198**  0.249***  
 
(2.054) (2.974) 
LEVERAGE 1.285***  1.336***  
 
(7.467) (9.025) 
PROFITABILITY -2.381**  -3.750***  
 
(-2.428) (-3.583) 
SIZE -0.124***  -0.173***  
 
(-4.143) (-6.173) 
GROWTH 0.182***  0.104* 
 
(3.486) (1.854) 
MTB 0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.627) (-0.727) 
ALTMANZ -0.091***  -0.070***  
 
(-4.814) (-4.463) 
CFVOLATILITY 3.890***  3.101***  
 
(3.948) (3.614) 
TANGIBILITY -0.042 -0.039 
 
(-0.322) (-0.296) 
RETURN 0.337***  0.143 
 
(2.976) (1.326) 
LMATURITY -0.005 -0.076 
 
(-0.073) (-1.241) 
LLOANSIZE -0.176***  -0.201***  
 
(-5.087) (-6.512) 
PPRICING -0.378***  -0.314***  
 
(-6.704) (-6.602) 
LNLENDER -0.085***  -0.037 
 
(-2.620) (-1.339) 
SYNDICATION -0.289**  -0.130 
 
(-2.055) (-1.073) 
CSPREAD 0.175 -0.185 
 
(0.717) (-0.787) 
TSPREAD 0.217**  0.172**  
 
(2.401) (2.111) 
Intercept 3.944***  4.967***  
 
(6.381) (8.747) 
Year fixed effect yes yes 
Industry fixed effect yes yes 
Loan purpose fixed effect yes yes 
Loan type fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 2,093 2,455 
Adjusted R2 0.498 0.518 
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Table 15 Loan Spread and Misreporting – The Effect of Lending Relationships 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. REL is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan facility is a relationship loan and 0 otherwise.  POSTMIS_REL 
is the interaction term of REL and POSTMIS. See Appendix A for all other variable definitions. 
 
OLS Regression with Dependent Variable = AIS 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
REL -0.216*** -0.269*** 
 
(-3.121) (-3.094) 
POSTMIS -0.050 -0.108 
 
(-0.625) (-1.009) 
POSTMIS_REL 0.200* 0.294** 
 
(1.777) (2.115) 
LEVERAGE 1.043*** 1.418*** 
 
(6.107) (6.571) 
PROFITABILITY -1.551 -1.804 
 
(-1.396) (-1.501) 
SIZE -0.114*** -0.135*** 
 
(-3.144) (-3.463) 
GROWTH 0.240*** 0.176*** 
 
(4.492) (2.843) 
MTB -0.002 0.011 
 
(-0.218) (0.865) 
ALTMANZ -0.086*** -0.088*** 
 
(-5.256) (-3.400) 
CFVOLATILITY 3.806*** 4.445*** 
 
(3.286) (3.293) 
TANGIBILITY 0.143 -0.033 
 
(0.992) (-0.196) 
RETURN 0.344*** 0.381*** 
 
(2.631) (2.642) 
LLOANSIZE -0.174*** -0.156*** 
 
(-4.512) (-3.613) 
PPRICING -0.401*** -0.409*** 
 
(-6.544) (-5.632) 
LNLENDER -0.081** -0.085** 
 
(-2.469) (-2.106) 
SYNDICATION -0.092 -0.208 
 
(-0.576) (-1.250) 
CSPREAD 0.411 0.692* 
 
(1.372) (1.892) 
TSPREAD 0.244** 0.262** 
 
(2.525) (2.227) 
Intercept 4.945*** 4.325*** 
 
(6.874) (4.735) 
Year fixed effect yes yes 
Industry fixed effect yes yes 
Loan purpose fixed effect yes yes 
Loan type fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 1,674 1,375 
Adjusted R2 0.540 0.487 
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Table 16 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
This table reports the estimated results from the SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) procedure 
including loan pricing, financial covenants, and loan maturity as dependent variables. 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
  
Variable AIS FINCOV LMATURITY 
RES 0.023 -0.011 0.056*** 
 
(0.517) (-0.204) (2.864) 
POSTMIS -0.019 0.005 0.064** 
 
(-0.329) (0.074) (2.515) 
POSTMIS_RES 0.167** 0.157** -0.074** 
 
(2.376) (2.004) (-2.370) 
LEVERAGE 1.168*** 0.811*** 0.052 
 
(9.529) (6.233) (0.958) 
PROFITABILITY -4.670*** 0.687 0.845*** 
 
(-7.970) (1.127) (3.259) 
SIZE -0.152*** -0.134*** -0.011 
 
(-7.680) (-5.331) (-1.313) 
GROWTH 0.158*** 0.019 -0.036** 
 
(4.205) (0.461) (-2.172) 
MTB -0.003 0.001 -0.000 
 
(-0.737) (0.187) (-0.013) 
ALTMANZ -0.088*** -0.021** 0.003 
 
(-9.687) (-2.262) (0.694) 
CFVOLATILITY 3.651*** -2.311*** -0.750** 
 
(5.505) (-3.212) (-2.557) 
TANGIBILITY 0.056 -0.172 0.026 
 
(0.575) (-1.584) (0.590) 
RETURN 0.343*** 0.167** 0.045 
 
(5.315) (2.541) (1.592) 
LLOANSIZE -0.195*** -0.118*** 0.073*** 
 
(-8.635) (-4.313) (7.349) 
PPRICING -0.319*** 0.085* 0.082*** 
 
(-8.074) (1.711) (4.675) 
LNLENDER -0.019 0.057* 0.033*** 
 
(-0.759) (1.926) (3.051) 
SYNDICATION -0.003 0.249** 0.084** 
 
(-0.029) (2.468) (2.167) 
CSPREAD -0.270 -0.454** -0.039 
 
(-1.343) (-2.048) (-0.434) 
TSPREAD 0.147** 0.120 -0.056* 
 
(2.123) (1.533) (-1.831) 
Intercept 4.771*** 4.471*** 1.237*** 
 
(4.688) (4.414) (2.747) 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effect yes yes yes 
Loan purpose fixed effect yes yes yes 
Loan type fixed effect yes yes yes 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Misreporting Variables 
RES An indicator variable that equals 1 if the borrower is a firm that 
subsequently restates previous financial statements and 0 
otherwise. 
POSTMIS  An indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank loan is initiated 
during the misreporting period and 0 if the bank loan is initiated 
before the inception of misreporting.  
POSTMIS_RES  The interaction term of RES and POSTMIS. 
 
Borrower-Specific Variables 
LEVERAGE   (Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities)/total assets. 
PROFITABILITY  EBITDA/total assets. 
SIZE    The natural logarithm of total assets. 
GROWTH   The growth of total sales measured in percentage. 
MTB Market value of equity/book value of common shareholders’ 
equity. 
ALTMANZ Altman’s Z-score, calculated as 4.34+0.08×working capital/total 
assets-0.04×retained earnings/total assets+0.1×earnings before 
interest and taxes/total assets+0.22×market value of equity/book 
value of total liabilities-0.06×Sales/total assets for manufacturing 
firms following Hillegeist et al. (2004), and 6.56×working 
capital/total assets+ 3.26×retained earnings/total 
assets+6.72×earnings before interest and taxes /total assets+ 
1.05×book value of equity/book value of total liabilities for non-
manufacturing firms following Altman(2000). 
CFVOLATILITY Standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from operations over 
the eight fiscal quarters prior to the loan initiation quarter scaled by 
total assets. 
TANGIBILITY   Net property, plant and equipment/total assets. 
RETURN Buy-and-hold stock return over the ninety days prior to the loan 
initiation date. 
Industry Indicators A series of indicator variables for the Fama and French’s 17 
industry definitions.  
 
Loan-Specific Variables 
AIS Loan spread measured as all-in-spread drawn in the Dealscan 
database, divided by 100. All-in-spread drawn is defined as the 
amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR 
equivalent for each dollar drawn down. (For loans not based on 
LIBOR, LPC converts the spread into LIBOR terms by adding or 
subtracting a differential that is adjusted periodically.) This 
measure adds the borrowing spread of the loan over LIBOR with 
any annual fee paid to the bank group. 
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FINCOV Financial covenant index constructed by counting the number of 
financial covenants included in a loan contract (at the deal, or 
package, level).  
MATURITY The maturity of the loan measured in months. 
LMATURITY The natural logarithm of MATURITY. 
LOANSIZE The amount of the loan facility measured in millions of dollars. 
LLOANSIZE The natural logarithm of LOANSIZE. 
PPRICING An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan contract includes 
performance pricing provisions, and 0 otherwise.    
NLENDER   The total number of banks in the loan contract. 
LNLENDER   The natural logarithm of NLENDER. 
SYNDICATION An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is syndicated, and 0 
otherwise. 
Loan Purpose Indicators A series of the indicator variables for the purposes of loan facilities 
in DealScan, including corporate purposes, debt repayment, 
working capital, capital expenditures, takeover, stock buybacks, 
etc. 
Loan Type Indicators A series of the indicator variables for the types of loan facilities in 
DealScan, including term loan, revolvers, and 364-day facilities. 
Macroeconomic Variables 
CSPREAD Difference in the yield between BAA and AAA corporate bonds 
measured one month before the loan initiation, obtained from 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
TSPREAD Difference in the yield between ten-year and two-year U.S. 
Treasury bonds measured one month before the loan initiation, 
obtained from Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
 
 
 
